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DEFENDING SOUTH AFRICAN CAPITALISM *
Merle Lipton's book, Capitalism and Apartheid, has excited attention
internationally and in South Africa essentially for two reasons. One is its •
engagement with the radical line of questioning about South African society that h
been debated heatedly since the 1970s. The second is that it functions as
an apologia for South African capitalism historically and contains a plea for
the continued centrality of white liberals and of a middle-of-the-road politics
that will crosscut the racial divide in which capitalists will play the major
part. Lipton thinks that capitalism and apartheid can be disengaged and she
herself opts for a solution in which South Africa could "get rid of apartheid,
i.e. have multi-racial(or non-racial) capitalism" because she believes...
"...it could be achieved with less violence than any of the other...
£solutionsj ; it does not rule out subsequent movement towards more
egalitarian,welfare-oriented politics; and it is the only option
compatible with the revival of the remnants of liberty and democracy:
the degree of coercion required to enforce each of the other options
seems incompatible with this." (12)
This is a book with which critics of the South African system have to engage
seriously; it contains substantial research in certain areas and it is full of
insights of considerable value and originality through its 400 odd page
length. Nonetheless it is a hard book with which to come to terms. It is divided
into three unbalanced parts. The middle and most substantial section,which
Lipton herself points out was finished basically by 1978, is a structural and
historical analysis which looks sectorally at South African capitalism,taking
agriculture,mining,secondary industry and white labour,each of which deserves
substantial attention from historians and economists. It is followed by a long
final section which amounts to a considered narrative discussion of events
over the past decade evaluating state reform options. It stops in 1983 but
an epilogue carries the discussion forward further to 1986 and to a degree
anticipates events over the past half-year fairly well. A first introductory
section is not very successful in welding this into a whole;there is a
tension between historical analysis and discussion and the political polemic
that occasionally can be found. Lipton is an author,moreover,who is eclectic;
perceptive insights clash with strange oversights and both are not always
contained consistently within any line of argument. Occasionally,she is
as a result contradictory and it is hard to speak conclusively about any argument
from the book that is not at times refuted by her own rich material. There is
also an imbalantce between her mastery of the material available to her up to 1978
and the many omissions in her reading thereafter. Finally and perhaps inevitably
in such a work,well-researched points are often punctuated by questionable
assertions that lack proof; her enthusiasm has allow/Tier to make too many
arguments. These points qualify the generalisations which will follow; Capitalism
and Apartheid needs to be characterised but eludes easy discussion.
In a telling chapter opening, Lipton asserts that:
"...apartheid cannot simply be explained as the outcome of capitalism or of
racism. Its origins lie in a complex interaction between class interests
(of white labour as well as of sections of capital) and racism/ethnicity,
reinforced by ideological and security factors." (365)
Broadly speaking,she sees apartheid, loosely used in tandem with its predecessor,
South African-style segregation, as having originally been useful to a broad
range of capitalists. At the least,it contained costs and benefits:
"The benefits were provided by a plentiful supply of cheap,unskilled
black workers and by the intervention of the state apparatus to ensure
their compliance. But losses were incurred because of the restrictions
on black competition in the skilled labour market." (7)
On the whole,she accepts the argument (found in both liberal and Marxist
work) that both agricultural and mining capitalists favoured key aspects of
the apartheid system during the floodtide of accumulation in these sectors
from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. Accumulation was
inherently linked to the availability of huge numbers of coerced workers
at bottom pay levels. However this is far less true,she argues,with regard
to manufacturers and merchants who "did not need,and indeed opposed,most
apartheid labour policies."(139) Finally she insists that those Marxists
who have tried to use class analysis to suggest that white workers had no
interest in pressing forward with apartheid are wrong; even on the mines,
it is they,rather than management,that insisted on the formal colour bar
and the many indirect discriminatory practices which were far more consequential.
Within these sectors and within the South African economy as a whole.however,
the advantages of a racial order have gradually diminished to capitalists, *
according to Lipton. Manufacturing has become more and more central to the
economy and brought with it demands for a more stabilised,educated and participatory
workforce. Even in agriculture and mining,a more democratic labour process is
gradually becoming mooted, although they are clearly more backward than
manufacturing. The conflicts, which reached a head in the 1960s, between the
«*a*e and the Nationalist-run state were thus quite real and unjustly underestimated
by radicals with a crude determinist view of the state as a mere front for
business interests. The state in time responded with the introduction of
policies ("reform") more sensitive to the objections of capitalists. When
reform began to founder in the middle 1980s,the capitalist began to look beyond
its confines to a broader political reconstruction. If anything it was white labour
and the entrenched bureaucracy which hindered the extension of reform,although
Lipton's interesting discussion of SACOL and TUCSA reveals her awareness of
ambiguity here too.
The contrast is most striking between Lipton and the revisionist Marxists of the
1970s Legassick,Wolpe and Johnstone and to a lesser extent with O'Meara,Kaplan,
Morris,Davies and Bozzoli from the following generation. It is much harder to draw
with the Marxist writing of the past five years that Lipton ignores but it must
be conceded that the older work continues to have considerable impact. If we
go back to Legassick, in his classic article, "South Africa:Capital Accumulation
and Violence",he insists on the functionality of violence, of harsh forms of
repression and a battery of forms considered as "extra-economic coercion" to
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the successes of South African capitalism. These forms are not "'archaisms'
but...the specific form which capitalism has taken." (Legassick,267) The
"specific structures of labour control which have been developed in post-war
South Africa are increasingly functional to capital"(269) These quotes fail
to do justice to the the rich and subtle knowledge of South African economic
and political history that are displayed in the texture of Legassick's writing,
but from the vantage point of 1987 it must be conceded that he presented a
version of capitalism in South Africa that is too lacking in contradiction and overly
functionalist to explain more recent developments properly.
The evidence of a broad evolution along the lines Lipton suggests,given her
many qualifications,is very strong. She is also right to query too easy a
link between the prosperity of the 1960s and Vervoerdian apartheid at its
most rigid.(^52-53) It is more peculiar that Lipton does not try to engage
vith more recent writers,such as Saul & Gelb.who particularly situate the
good years as bringing on a continuing "organic crisis" which has,in the
past decade amongst other things, reduced profits seriously, chipped away
under further business investment and revealed basic structural blockages
in the prospects of successful capitalist accumulation in South Africa.
That this shift has occurred is incontrovertible. It is no longer possible
to assert that South African capitalism has an inherent need for compounds,
passes,the absence of black labour unions,etc. even while stressing (and
this Lipton concedes)that such writers as Legassick were able successfully
to explain the historic advantages of such techniques. Capitalism is
by its nature protean and dynamic. A problem with Lipton's critique,
however,is that she fails to point out the hi«*-nnip significance^within
South Africa's intellectual history^of the '70s revisionist arguments set as
they were in turn against the crude positivist arguments put forward by
liberals such as Horwitz,Houghton,Doxey,Hutt and O'Dowd; their work
produced material on which Lipton and others can stand and move forward.
The '70s revisionism in this aspect need not so much to be rejected as to
be contextualised and used critically.
There ought to be debate about the many particular points with reference to
particular sectors of capital that punctuate the middle section of the book
but I propose here only to consider a few,of which one element is the
relation of white labour to capital. It must be said that Lipton,throughout the
study and with somewhat grievous results as she reaches contemporary issues,
is overly generous to the capitalists and keeps stacking the cards in their
favour in ways that are not going to stand easily. I do not disagree with
Lipton's view of white workers' historic situation as expressed minimally;
a serious examination of their history does reveal a committed tradition
and a material interest in drawing racial boundaries. Such boundaries were
in South Africa as elsewhere a potentially powerful and effective means of
cultural and economic defense against the bosses. She is moreover right
to emphasize that this,rather than an argument based on the historic eccentricity
of Afrikaners,is what explains their racism. Although there does exist a
political and scholarly literature which assumes that class-conscious white
workers should necessarily be committed to class unity across racial or
ethnic lines,there are numerous scholars on the left who have come to grips
effectively with reality not operating this way and this Lipton chooses to
ignore. An important comparative study which considers the problem is Stan
Greenberg's Race and Class in Capitalist Development; Greenberg uses the
idea of a bounded working class which adopts different strategies in the
South African case depending on skill and organisational conditions. The
approach Eddie Webster adopts in Cast in a Racial Mould is similiar,while
focussing on a particular industry.
Accepting then that white labour plays an important autonomous role in the
forging of apartheid,it is another thing to accept Lipton's arguments that
capital was indifferent to the colour of its workers. There is a great
deal of evidence to suggest that mining capital did not want an all-African
labour force on the Witwatersrand any more than it wanted a ruinously expensive
all-white one. If the question of where to draw the racial boundary line
was hazy and contentious,this hardly means that there was no understanding of the
effectiveness of a racially exclusive supervisory class or of a broader white
"community" that internalised and defended capitalist values. She could read wit
profit the work that Rob Turrell and Alan Mabin have produced on the
history of the diamond diggings at Kimberley and the way that management came
to sort out white and black workers very deliberately from early pre-Rand
days. In the opinion of Alan Mabin,
"...control of the labour force had extended to the social and spatial
separation of black and white workers...in the conflict between labour
and capital,the latter had asserted its dominance in part through
compounding and the manipulation pf a hierarchical, racial and
geographical division of labour."
The effectiveness of racial hierarchies as a managerial tool comes out clearly
in Michael Burawoy's comparison of the labour process on the Zambian copper
mines before and after their disappearance in the contemporary era. The
Copperbelt mines of Northern Rhodesia depended on the existence of what Ke.
calls "colonial despotism" for their smooth running. "An overt and explicit
racism was the organizing proinciple behind...production apparatuses." The
"company state",as he calls it, only began to disintegrate when
challenges came from industrial strikes and political nationalism. The
industrial order then weakened and required the direct intervention of the
Zambian state at (frequent)moments of crisis. From this,one can derive
two points. One is that that intervention was not always so successful and
the non-racist control system far less effective from the crucial perspective
of productivity. The other is that the history shows that the true colours
of mining capital were most clearly unfurled in the era of racist colonial
practice and only taken down under duress.
Had South African managers been uninterested in using ethnic and racial
divisions to control workers,they would have been curiously indifferent to
techniques well-documented for bosses in many parts of the world. She
reminds us of Marx's understanding of the capitalist mode of production as
one that overrides ancient distinctions of nation and caste (4) but she
conveniently forgets his opinions on the significance of the division between
Irish and English workers in keeping capitalist hegemony in British factories.
To reiterate,from a well-known 1870 letter:
"Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a
working class divided into two hostile camps,English proletarians
and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the
Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life...
His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the "poor whites"
to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the U.S.A. The.
Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in
the English worker at once the accomplice and the stupid tool of the
English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive
and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short,
by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This
antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class
despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist,,
class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it."
From these strictures there is nothing to exclude the manufacturers. They
were very slow to move from assuming a world of white workers and affluent
consumers to thinking, first of blacks even as purchasers of industrial
commodities and then with time as operatives. The assumption of white control and
supervision and of racially defined jobs was unquestioned until quite
recently just as women workers were as a matter of course to be paid
less than,and subordinated to male supervisors. Lipton appreciates that
resentment of rigid state requirements on how employers could choose their workers had
mostly to do with the relative wages different categories of labour could
earn but she does not like to take the obvious point that the existence of
differentials was in and of itself most desirable to management. That manufacturers
worried,for instance under the Pact government, that the state would force
them to hire too many whites is certainly the case but it hardly means that they
opposed "apartheid" unless one reduces apartheid to the single issue of labour
rigidity. The whole point of the antagonism to state policy was hardly that
of defending a colour-blind employment programme. It was to combat dreams of
turning urban or industrial South Africa into an Australian model white Utopia
and to defend the right of employers to hire relatively poorly-paid and
disorganised black operatives. Black industrial workers may have earned more
than their counterparts in mining or agriculture but that only displays the
relative imperatives and labour market conditions that governed the circumstances
of different capitalists and the problems that ensued in their coming together
in a politically effective manner.
Lipton conveniently chooses to forget the virulent fear of Indian business
wK-.Tf
competition that was so typical of the-'petty bourgeoisie of the Transvaal and
Natal, the tendency to switbh conveniently between different racial groups
on the part of employers when militant activity threatened or the support of
business for social segregation in the cities. Part of apartheid may involve
attempts at absolute exclusion of blacks from urban communities and it is
undoubtedly true that manufacturing capital found such attempts inconvenient
and opposed them. However, it must be said that they equally favoured the
isolation of black workers into separate townships even if they were generally
too mealy-mouthed to want to pay for the facilities. Even in the 1980s,
it is simply untrue that all manufacturers disapproved of "extra-economic"
controls over their workers or that they supported the right of all to come and
live where they liked. In such an advanced sector as the metal industry on
the East Rand, many companies have preferred and retained a migrant labour-force
when workers with Section Ten rights would have been available. Thus in a poll
summarized by Webster from a 1980 publication, the majority of foundry managers
"indicated a cljar preference for 'homeland labour1 rather than local labour,"
and in general took the view that rural migrants were more compliant,reliable and
harder-working. A study of management attitudes by Ann Bernstein of the
Urban Foundation made even later records a large minority (45%)who preferred
the retention of all or some influx control legislation. Such controls
retain considerable charms for capitalists even in advanced industrial societies
today,as witness the use of migrant third world labour in America or Western
Europe.
A number of historians before Lipton have remarked on the period of the 1940s as
one fed that represents a hiatus in the general trend towards the intensification
of segregation: the creation of a racial state. Lipton puts particular emphasis
on it as the first sign of the pre-eminence of liberalising industrial capital.
She writes that "in 1948 South Africa was an oligarchic democracy which seemed
on the verge of gradually incorporating the black vanguard into its ranks."
(cf 274ff) Lipton is correct in pointing to significant reform proposals in
response to the new context of industrialisation and unprecedented urbanisation
and to the particular and short-lived circumstances that brought on the
reforming wave. Nonetheless her view is decidedly too cheerful in its own
terms. It is not only that the more far-reaching reform proposals date
almost entirely to the war period and were generally withdrawn or suspended
thereafter but that they were almost entirely administrative with few political
concessions envisioned(as she elsewhere grants,22). They are in short very
remniscent of the reform proposals renewed by the Nationalist government in
the 1970s and the deterioration of relations between the increasingly
nationalistic and militant ANC and the Smuts government.by 1948 suggests that
the conflicts that would follow were inevitable whatever the outcome of the
1948 election. It is thus not so""/1 that there is a danger in overestimating
the prospects for major reform in the 1940s,which Lipton does not really do
but that she shifts too easily into a narrow definition of apartheid as a
particular form of rigid labour control to emphasize the anti-apartheid
spirit of the reforms. She is right to see that the existing controls were
beginning to be questioned but wrong to see them as the heart of the
entire South African problematic.
In the same way,she exaggerates the importance of conflict over black labour
policies after 1948 betwen capital and the state (with relation to colour bars
and to the physical movements of Africans). In italics,she emphasizes that
businessmen were"not converted to support for apartheid labour policies."(304)
She considers this period as one of a "surly working relationship-rather than
a state of war-between capital and government"(285) Lipton suffers here
from a weak conceptualisation of the idea of a capitalist state,although she
is right enough to point to the equally mechanical and economistic notions
of some Marxists on the question. In fact,wherever capitalist societies have
stabilised and working classes are "incorporated" in the political order,
the state has had to absorb pressures and respond to needs that are not in
the narrowest sense those of the ruling class^repeatedly and systematically.
This is why, following Gramsci and others, the idea of hegemony has generally
replaced a simple view of ruling politicians as front-men for monopoly
capital among Marxists even in assessing thoroughgoing capitalist societies
such as the USA or Japan. ^
The tension between capitalist and state in post-1948 South Africa has
strong ethnic undertones but that is not very unusual either in capitalist
societies,especially given the convulsions that have swept such parts of the
world as ex-colonial Asia or eastern Europe. The English-Afrikaner split and
the attempt by an Afrikaner-dominated state to intrude into the domain of
big business in South Africa^ with its ensuing strains, finds many parallels.
Rather than exaggerate their importance.it might be more useful to
suggest that the issues that divided capitalists from the state were perhaps
less important than many others where the Malan government and its
successors,never anti-capitalist, were basically sympathetic to business
needs. As she concedes grudgingly in the remark about a state of war,
business retained a fundamental loyalty to the state and its characteristic
institutions and could not have been more remote from an alliance with any
forces that might seek to bring it down (and such forces were beginning
to gather by the 1950s). Moreover the Nationalists were totally committed
to creating favourable conditions for capitalist accumulation. Lipton's claims
that the business slowdown of the late 1950s reflected hostility to apartheid
founders on the international recession o£ the period which actually explains
the local conjuncture most effectively. After 1960,Lipton asserts that
"while businessmen were relieved by the restoration of political stability and the
expansionary economic policies,they were not concerted to apartheid labour policies.1
(304). She italicises these words but one is inclined to respond,so what?
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Much business "opposition" here had more to do with getting cheaper workers than
a commitment to a more open society.
The reason why this point needs dissection is because it leads Lipton astray in
assessing the more recent period. "Reform" has meant that business views on the
economy received increasing cooperation from the state; the post-1976 era is in many
respects a reprise of the pre-1948 era and the state is now fulfilling some of what
was then envisioned. Similarly,the reform programme is thin politically and
directed strictly from the top. Until 1985,this meant that virtually all South
African capitalists backed the Botha government,which seemed to offer them what
they require, like they had no other government in forty years. While many
have since become deeply upset by black (and international) rejection of
reform,Lipton enormously exaggerates their potential to move beyond this
position. Such recent documents as the Business Charter, which she approvingly
cites, reveal the political barrenness of business circles, their fear of
mass democratisation, their resentment of state "interference" that doesn't
boost their profits and their emphasis on privatisation of national resources as the
answer to the country's problems.
Lipton claims that "the trend is towards increasing opposition and it has been
accelerating." In 1986,one is rather struck by a)the willingness of most Afrikaner
businessmen (who now constitute a very significant group) to rally around the
state; b)the equivocal attitude by business towards the state of emergency and
the repressive activities of the state and c)the obvious reluctance of any but
a handful of businessmen to think much beyond the existing political order. Even
the much-heralded visit of Gavin Relly and others to the AHC reflects at most an
interest in negotiation and perhaps incorporation rather than a potential
political alliance,as both sides recognise. Capitalists envision substantial
political change "majoritarianism"—-with trepidation to say the least,
to take Lipton's own phrase.
Lipton exaggerates the appeal of trade unions to South African capitalists.
My latest Financial Maiycontains,among it6 1986 prizes and brickbats,high
praise to General Motors for crushing union resistance to its "disinvestment"
plans. Lipton cannot explain this through her insistence on the generalised
preference of efficient firms for strong trade unions with which to negotiate.
Recent court revelations indicate that the peaceful co-existence of SAAWU and
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business in East London hailed by Lipton (173) in reality masked the close
cooperation between business and the security police. Too much political
disruption brings capitalists to the point of trying to hire fewer black
workers as their top priority. In Port Elizabeth, a number of firms have
replaced African with Coloured or white workers, an increasingly important
strategy. This is a feasible strategy in many cases because of rising
unemployment and because industrial expansion,if it again takes off,
would involve saving,not hiring labour,in accordance with international
trends. Trade unions,in short,are tolerable to big business when the
alternative is disruption and crisis but their appeal diminishes with
bad times and low profits.
Merle Lipton deserves praise in her insistence on the desirability of liberal,
tolerant values, of autonomous social institutions and of peaceful change
over massive bloodshed in South Africa. However, and despite some excellent
and sobering observations that she makes on the current situation, she comes
across as naive in her optimism about the growing strength of middle ground
opinion,powered by the ever more enlightened view of big business. The
surveys on which she relies,very dubious with regard to black views,may be
essentially correct in revealing a gradual relaxation of the racist views of
white South Africans over time. These give good evidence of support for
the kind of cautious change that does not challenge power relations in the
society over which the Botha government presides. Few South African capitalists
after all support the HNP or CP:many would be only too pleased with a PFP
government. Most could adjust to the kind of deracialised capitalist
ideology dominant now in the West i_{ the result would be societies effectively
and stably capitalist on the model of the USA, West Germany,France,etc.
To derive from this an assumption that one could move readily to a convergence
of white and black around a politics of compromise and a common acceptance of
many existing structures, particularly those sustaining the economy, is
quite a jump, from this. One must put aside the polarising developments she
herself explicates in her final epilogue and dismiss the power and extent
of township militancy which she routinely underestimates.
In general, capitalists are poised uncomfortably in South Africa (and not
only the white ones)between a past, which,even if it departed from an
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idealised Friedmanesque "free to choose" model, has been one with which they could
live,breathe and grow but which seems no longer politically viable (and is abhorred
internationally) and a most dubious future towards which they are not very eager
to leap. They do not really care to lift up the anchor of "white securityy"(82)
and sail off. This is to some extent captured in the concept of racial
capitalism,with its inherent definition of capitalism in South Africa as part of a
particular political and social order and a particular history. The term "racial
capitalism" is perhaps unfortunate because it implies a rigid commitment to
racial hierarchy over all business practices, assumes the South African power structure
and "apartheid" are identical and as such underestimates flexibility and adaptability
which are also there. No doubt,for instance,the Anglos management would welcome a
consortium of Indian or even African businessmen into the world of gold mining
just as they once did Afrikaners. Much of Lipton's assessment therefore of the
"modernisation" of the economy is valuable.
However,if we reconsider the question of the state and capital, it is indubitable
that business is frightened of a shift, a fundamental shift, in the nature of the
state. The likelihood that black majority rule or ANC rule would bring to bear
forces that are overtly anti-capitalist and a leadership with little taste or
capacity for the running of a capitalist society is much greater than the shift
that 1948 brought. The corruption and incompetence of capitalist African countries
must be almost as feared by analogy as the revolutionary moves of socialist
ones. To repeat the Burawoy argument,post-colonial African countries such as
Zambia have generally been marked,with the decline of authoritarian,racially-
defined authority patterns at work,by declines in productivity and an increase
in 'theft and indiscipline that plagues capital. The state is much less suited
given its power base to assist business in many respects. The result is a
decline in production,in overall trade and in investment. Why should South Africa
be different without reliable guarantees of continuity after apartheid goes?
What stake could Africans have in a capitalism characterised by intense concentration
of power and wealth and at the same time unemployment and poverty even if no formal
racial rules existed? Already South Africa is plagued by the reluctance of
capitalists to invest and their efforts to bring capital out of the country.
If a revolutionary bssak could bring capital advantages, particularly given the
brakes which Lipton convincingly shows apartheid has increasingly come to apply
in the strictly economic sphere (by analogy with the anti-feudal revolutions
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of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries).business would certainly
support it. The South African case is however a far slipperier one and as a result
Lipton's line of argument is finally no more convincing or related to the actual
prospects awaiting South Africa than those she claims for the radicals of the 1970s
on the rigidity and functionality of South African capitalism that she is eager to
dismiss and displace. The problem is not that South African capitalists converge
in a secret conspiracy to retain apartheid; it is that apartheid is the Tar Baby
from which they find no escape. The reader will need to give time and attention
to the valuable aspects of Lipton's critique but in so doing her own economism,
always anxious to reduce South African social problems to the issue of labour
movement controls and the legal colour bar, and her softness towards South African
business"liberalism" must be laid bare.
These would include studies of South African business: Renfrew Christie,Electricity,
Industry and Class in South Africa(Macmillan,198A): Duncan Innes, Anglo;Anglo~
American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (Ravan,1984); of business ideology,
Belinda Bozzoli.The Political Nature of a Ruling Class(RKP,1981);of race and the
labour process in industry, Jon Lewis, Industrialisation and Trade Union Organisation
in South Africa 1924-55,(Cambridge University Press,1984); Eddie Webster, Cast in a
Racial Mould,(Ravan,1985); critiqueing the main thrust of early '70s revisionism,
D.C.Hindson,"The Pass System and the Formation of an Urban African Proletariat in
!>6uth Africa; A Critique of the Cheap Labour-Power Thesis,"D.Phil,1983,Sussex (forth-
coming in book form, Ravan); re-examining the Verwoerdian period, D.Posel,
"Rethinking the Race-Class Debate in South African Historiography",Social Dynamics,
IX(1),1983 and posing alternative syntheses: Stanley Creenberg.Race and Class in
Capitalist DeveIopment(Yale University Press,1980) ; David Yudelman.The Emergence
of Modern South Africa,(Greenwood Press,1983) or John Cell,The Highest Stage of
White Supremacy(Cambridge University Press,1983). Yudelman particularly anticipates
some of her strongest lines of argument.
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Martin Legassick,"South Africa:Capital Accumulation and Violence",Economy and Society,
111(3),1974.
I have elaborated on these issues with regard to works of history in reviewing the
collections by Atmore 4 Marks,ed..Economy and Society j^i Pre-industrial South Africa
and Marks & Rathbone.ed.,Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa in
Review of African Political Economy,29(1984). The crucial question of class which
remains a major legacy of the revisionists is untouched by Lipton although she
often seems to acknowledge its terminology and its insights.
For an approach very different to Lipton,see John Saul & Stephen Gelb.The Crisis in
South Africa,(Monthly Review Press,1981 but recently re-edited and released). It i~
an odd feature of Lipton that she gives enormous weight to economic factors but fails
to make an assessment of the situation and prospects of the current economy.
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Webster and Greenberg. See £n 1.
On this see Bozzoli.fn 1. Also Bill Freund,"The Social Character of Secondary
Industry in South Africa 1915-45",ASI seminar paper,University of the Witwatersrand
1985. Lipton does not easily see that classes are not purely reduceable to
forces of production.
Alan Mabin,"Labour,Capital,Class Struggle and the Origins of Residential
Segregation in Kimberley 1880-1920",Journal of Historical Geography,XII(l),
1986,16-18. See also R.V. Turrell,"Kimberley:Labour and Compounds 1871-88" in
Marks & Rathbone.op.cit.
7Michael Burawoy.The Politics of Production,(New Left Books,1985),226.
o
Karl Marx to £.Meyer & A.Vogt,9 April 1970,in Marx and Engels on Colonialism
(Progress Publishers,1959,337)
9webster,204-05.
Ann Bernstein,"Influx Control in Urban South Africa:An International and
Empirical View" in Hermann Giliomee & Lawrence Schlemmer.eds. ,l)p Against the
Fences,(David Philip,1986)
Bill Freund
January 1987
Department of Economic History,Durban
